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PRE-TRIAL DISCOVERY OF LIABILITY
INSURANCE POLICY LIMITS
I. INTRODUCTION

An unresolved procedural question, yet to be passed upon
by the Supreme Court of North Dakota, arises in a situation
which can best be elucidated by a hypothetical case. The plaintiff files an action seeking compensation for personal injuries
sustained in an automobile collision allegedly caused by the
defendant's negligence. In taking a discovery deposition of the
defendant the plaintiff propounds the question-Did you
have, on the automobile involved herein, a liability insurance
policy in force and effect at the time of the accident and, if
so, what are the limits of that policy, as well as the name and
address of the company? The defendant objects to the question
as not being reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
evidence admissible at trial.' Assuming this to be a federal
court, or a state court which has adopted the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, the court must decide whether, pursuant
to Rule 26(b) governing scope of discovery depositions, the
objection should be sustained.
II.

SCOPE OF EXAMINATION

Rule 26(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
"Scope of Examination. Unless otherwise ordered
by the court as provided by Rule 30(b) or (d), the
deponent may be examined regarding any matter,
not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates
to the claim or defense of the examining party or to
the claim or defense of any other party, including
the existence, description, nature, custody, condition
and location of any books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons
having knowledge of relevant facts. It is not ground
for objection that the testimony will be inadmissible
1.
See Bischoff v. Koenig, 100 N.W.2d 159 (N.D. 1959) where mention of
insurance before a jury is not allowed and when it occurs the defendant
may be granted a mistrial.
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at the trial if the testimony sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence. ' ' 2
The last sentence of this Rule was added by the 1946 Amendments to make clear that the scope of examination may cover
inquiry into matters inadmissible as evidence at the trial.3
The tenor of the Rules as set forth in Rule 1 indicates that
a liberal construction is required. 4 In the light of this intended
construction, as Well as the direction provided by the 1946
Amendment, the test of relevancy for taking a deposition is
much broader than relevancy at the trial, since the discovery of evidence or any other matter which may' help a
party in preparing or presenting his case lies within the
purview of the discovery rules.5

III. NARROWING THE CONTROVERSY
Whether or not discovery questions pertaining to a defendant's liability insurance limits satisfy the "relevancy"
test of the Rules, as amended, is a question which has divided
both federal and state courts for the past decade. It is settled
law that where insurance for some reason would be admissible
at trial, discovery is permitted. Thus, before analyzing the
cases which account for the split of authority on discovery
of policy limits it is necessary to dissociate the cases which
should not be considered as authority for either allowing or
disallowing disclosure.
In Layton v. Cregan& Mallory Co.,6 where ownership of an
automobile was put in issue, the plaintiff was allowed to discover the insurance policy to enable him to ascertain the owner
thereunder. The court said, insurance is inadmissible only
2.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 33 provides in part: "Interrogatories may relate to
any matters which can be inquired into under Rule 26(b).
N.D.R. Civ.
P. 26(b) and 33 are identical to the Federal Rules.

3.

Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 329 U.S. 839, 854

(1947). -For cases which interpreted Rule 26(b)
liberally prior to the
adoption of the 1946 Amendment, See Engl v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 139 F.2d
469, 472 (2d Cir. 1943); Mackerer v. New York Cent. R.R., 1 F.R.D. 408
(E.D.N.Y. 1940).

4. Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 states: "They shall be construed to secure the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action."
5.
K-aiser-Frazer Corp. v. Otis & Co., 11 F.R.D. 50, 53 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
See also 4 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 26.16, at 1067 (2d ed. 1950)

where stated:
"The Rules contemplate that ordinarily the deponent shall answer
all questions except those to which he objects on the ground of privilege,
and that
all other objections shall be saved until the actual trial."
6.
263 Mich. 30, 248 N.W. 530 (1933).
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where it is not relevant and injected for the sole reason to
prejudice the jury. Thus insurance is admissible when put
in issue and consequently discoverable. In a more recent
case, Christie v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Michigan, production of a liability insurance policy for inspection was
ordered on the theory that the policy would possibly be admissible in evidence as tending to establish that a university
board of regents had waived its immunity from liability to
the extent of the insurer's monetary obligation. The case of
Goheen v. Goheen8 was decided prior to the adoption of the
1946 Amendment and hence cannot be considered as authority
for refusing discovery. Likewise, the case of Bean v Best is
inappropriate, as South Dakota had adopted the Rules prior to
the 1946 Amendment and had not subsequently incorporated
the Amendment into their Rules. The court expressly set
this forth as the reason for refusing discovery. Equally inappropriate are state court decisions arising in jurisdictions
which have rules narrower or broader in scope than the
Federal Rules.'
IV.

CASE ANALYSIS

The first case concerning disclosure of insurance limits,
without regard to insurance being at issue and decided under
the Rules as they now exist, was Orgel v. McCurdy.11 The
court in overruling the defendant's objection stated that
information sought by an examination of the policy need only
be generally relevant to the subject matter of the pending
action. 1 - This case has stood for a liberal construction of the
Rules in determining the scope of discovery.
In Brackett v. Woodall Food Products,- the plaintiff sought
to discover, in an interrogatory, the defendant's insurance
policy for the reason that punitive damages were sought and
hence inquiry into the defendant's assets would be permissi7. 364 Mich. 202, 111 N.W.2d 30 (1961).
8. 9 N.J. Misc. 507, 154 Atl. 393 (1931).
9. 76 S.D. 462, 80 N.W.2d 565 (1957).
10. See Iowa R. Civ. P. 141(a) (Prohibits discovery of policy limits);
N.J.R. Civ. P. 4:16-2 (Requires disclosure of policy limits). See also Verrastro v. Grecco, 21 Conn. Supp. 165, 149 A.2d 703 (1958).
11.
8 F.R.D. 585 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
12. Id. at 586 "Under Federal Rule 26(b) it is not necessary to establish admissibility of testimony; it is sufficient that the inquiry be made
as to matters generally bearing on the issue and relevant thereto."
13.

12 F.R.D. 4 (E.D. Tenn. 1951).
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ble. The court held that insurance was not an asset of the
insured, but rather was purchased for the sole purpose of protection against claimants of the insured. Nevertheless, on the
broad viewpoint that insurance limits are relevant to the subject matter of the litigation and within the purview of Rules
26(b) and 34, it can be discovered. The modern trend of
financial responsibility legislation in the direction of requiring motor carriers to maintain liability insurance 1 4 and
operators of motor vehicles to establish proof of financial
responsibility-s greatly influenced the Brackett decision. The
court said:
"From the tenor and purpose of such legislation
it is obvious that such insurance policies are definitely relevant to the subject matter of pending actions
growing out of accidents covered by such policies,
especially in view of the fact that this legislation
apparently would require the defendant to disclose to
the state authority the information concerning the
insurance which plaintiffs seek, and this would be
a matter of public record." 16
A "gathering storm" of opposition to discovery of policy
limits arose after the Brackett decision. This is evidenced by
McClure v. Boeger,1 wherein discovery was disallowed. The
court conceded that in a case where a passenger is suing for
medical pay it is possible to discover the policy as the plaintiff's claim arises out of contract and he need not prove
liability to recover. But in the absence of a medical pay provision discovery of insurance limits should not be allowed
until judgment is secured.
"Of course, the fact that the information would
not be relevant and that the fact of liability insurance could not be introduced at the trial does not
necessarily forbid discovery, but whatever advantages the plaintiff might gain are not advantages
which have anything to do with his presentation of
his case at trial and do not lead to disclosure of the
kind of information which is the objective of dis-'
covery procedure."' Is
14.

Federal Motor Carriers Act, 68 Stat. 528, 49 U.S.C. 315; Tenn. Code

§ 5501.9 (Williams 1951).
15.
Tenn. Code §§ 2715.49-68 (Williams 1951).
16.
Brackett v. Woodall Food Products, Inc., supra note 13, at 6.
17.
105 F. Supp. 612 (E.D. Penn. 1952).
18.
Id. at 613.
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The lines were now drawn and the courts lined up behind
the two irreconcilable holdings, numerically equal in strength.
When the question next came up it was the proponents'
turn to score a victory. The Court of Appeals of Kentuckyheld that the standard automobile liability policy evidences
a contract which inures to the benefit of every person injured due to the insured's negligence and is discoverable.
The court said the insurance company is in fact one of the
real parties in interest-in view of the fact they control the
investigation and subsequent litigation from the outset. Furthermore, an insurance contract is no longer a secret, confidential arrangement between the insurance company and the
insured but is an agreement that embraces those whose person or property may be injured by the negligent act of the
insured. "If the insurance question is relevant to the subject
matter after the plaintiff prevails, why is it not relevant while
the action pends ?-12o This court thought it was.
After a decisive majority of Minnesota judges had held
discovery of policy limits proper, 21 the Minnesota Supreme
Court in Jeppesen v. Swanson-2 refused disclosure.
"It would be far better to amend the rules so as
to state what may and what may not be done in
that field than-to stretch the present discovery rules
which the language
so as to accomplish something
' 3
of the rules does not permit. '2
McNelley v. Perry24 followed the Jeppesen case refusing discovery on the basis that "the purpose of seeking information
from an adversary, or a witness, is two-fold: (1) to use it in
the trial, or (2) to use it as a lead to information for use in
the trial."2-5
The Supreme Court in Illinois2 6 determined that insurance was discoverable in light of the intended purpose of the
Rules and the financial responsibility legislation which provides that the insurer's obligation becomes absolute after the
occurrence of the insured's accident. The court reasoned
19. Maddox v. Grauman, 265 S.W.2d 939 (Ky. 1954). See also Hurt v.
Cooper, 175 F. Supp. 712 (W.D. Ky. 1959).
20. Maddox v. Grauman, supra note 19, at 942.
21. WRIGHT, MINNESOTA RULES 165 (1954).
2'2. 243 Minn. 547, 68 N.W.2d 649 (1955).
23. Id. at 658.
24. 18 F.R.D. 360 (E.D. Tenn. 1955).
25. Idl. at 361.
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that refusal of discovery would deprive the injured party of
knowledge of his rights against the insurer and would permit avoidance of statutory obligations by the insurer. Defendant contended that insurance is like all other assets of
the defendant, and if discovery is allowed in respect to insurance then discovery of other assets would follow. The
court, in rejecting this argument, pointed out that insurance
exists for no other purpose than satisfying the liability it
covers and hence can not be categorized with other assets.
However, a year later two federal court decisions in Illinois
refused discovery of insurance limits on the basis of insurance being an asset of the defendant 27 and not being evidenti2
ary matter to be used at trial. 1
The Supreme Courts of Colorado 29 and Montana 30 have allowed discovery on the basis of their respective financial responsibility' acts, 31 as well as the spirit and purpose of the
Rules. The Montana decision states discovery should be allowed even if there were no legislative provisions purporting
to give an interest in insured's policy to the injured party. In
support of this statement the court referred to Volume I of
Insurance Policy Annotations, 32 where in provisions of a standard automobile liability insurance policy are set forth as
follows:
"Any person or his legal representative who has
secured such judgment or written agreement shall
thereafter be entitled to recover under the terms of
this policy in the same
33 manner and to the same
extent as the insured.
26.

People ex rel. Terry v.

Fisher, 12 Ill. 2d

231, 145 N.E.2d

588 (1957).

See also Laddon v. superior Court, 167 Cal. App. 2d 391, 334 P.2d 638
(1959) wherein the court relied on California's discovery act which is
patterned after the Fed. R. Civ. P. in allowing discovery of limits.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Gallimore v. Dye, 21 F.R.D. 283 (E.D. Ill. 1958).
Roembke v. Wisdom, 22 F.R.D. 197 (S.D. Ill. 1958).
Lucas v. District Court, 140 Colo. 510, 345 P.2d 1064 (1959).
Johanek v. Aberle, 27 F.R.D. 272 (D. Mont. 1961).

31. Colo. Rev. Stat. art. 7, § 13-7-23(2) (1953); Mont. Rev. Code ch. 4,
§ 53-438(f) (1947). Both statutes contain the following provision:
"Every motor vehicle liability policy shall be subject to the following provisions which need not be contained therein: (1) The liability of
the insurance carrier with respect to the insurance required by this act
(chapter) shall become absolute whenever injury or damage covered by
said motor vehicle liability policy occurs; said policy may not be canceled

or annulled as to such liability by any agreement between the insurance
carrier and the insured after the occurrence of the injury or damage; no
atatement made by the insured or on his behalf and no violation of said
policy shall defeat or void said policy .... "
32. ABA I Insurance Policy Ann. 108 (1941).
33.
Ibid.

1963]

NOTES

Therefore it was concluded that this provision gives the plaintiff a discoverable interest in the insured's policy as much
as does a statutory provision rendering insurer's obligation
34
absolute after an accident has occurred.
The most recent cases indicate that the controversy is nowhere near being a dead issue. Three of these cases have refused discovery, 35 two have allowed it, 3s and a sixth
case 37 refused disclosure only because there was little evidence
to prove liability of the defendant.
V. CONCLUSION

There is no weight of authority for either refusing or allowing discovery of policy limits but it appears that the weight
of reason is on the side of interpreting the Rules as permitting
such disclosure. Refusal to allow discovery does little to
advance the "just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
every action." Without knowledge of the policy limits there
is no possible way the plaintiff can accurately weigh the
merits of settling his case or proceeding to trial and incurring additional litigation costs. If the policy limits are low
and his damages substantial, then it would be to his advantage
to settle for a sum less than his case merits, particularly when
the defendant is judgment proof. This disclosure would also
afford the defendant some protection where the plaintiff, not
knowing the policy limits, proceeds to trial and obtains a judgment in excess of the policy limits. Here, the defendant is
burdened with the excess liability whereas if the plaintiff
had been apprised of the policy limits he would probably
have accepted a settlement figure within them and avoided
the resultant hardship on the defendant as well as saving
himself the costs of trial. A noted authority on insurance
law believes the insurer's refusal to disclose policy limits is
unconscionable and that the excess liability should be shouldered by the insurer38 For this reason, at least one defense
34. Johanek v. Aberle, supra note 25, at 275.
35. Cooper v. Stender, 30 F.R.D. 389 (E.D. Tenn. 1962); I-illman v. Penny, 29 F.R.D. 159 (E.D. Tenn. 1962); Langlois v. Allen, 30 F.R.D. 67 (D.
Conn. 1962).
36. Hill v. Greer, 30 F.R.D. 64 (D.N.J. 1961); Novak v. Good Will Grange
No. 127, 28 F.R.D. 394 (D. Conn. 1961).
37. Rosenberger v. Vallejo, 30 F.R.D. 352 (W.D. Penn. 1962).
38. Appleman, Circumstances Creating Excess Liability,-ABA Insurance,
Negligence and Compensation Law 315 (1960).
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attorney has come out strongly in favor of requiring disclosure of policy limits

s

There is also merit in the practical utility of disclosure in
the way of relieving crowded court calendars by encouraging
settlement before trial.
"In the matter of eliminating or avoiding calendar
congestion, the great service of pre-trial discovery ...

procedures lies in the impetus they produce

toward voluntary settlement ....The reason that the
contribution toward settlements is great is simply
that the procedures create an atmosphere
necessarily
' ' 40
conducive to voluntary settlements.

Refusal to allow discovery of policy limits is hardly conducive
to settlement.
It is submitted that when the courts of this state are confronted with this question, discovery of insurance policy
limits should be allowed. The contention that insurance is
not relevant to the issue of liability and cannot lead to evidence admissible at trial is more than adequately answered
by those cases which have given the Rules a liberal construction as was intended. 41 Those few cases which have mistakenly
categorized insurance with other assets of the defendant are
not persuasive."2
The statutory provisions which led many courts to believe
that the plaintiff had a discoverable interest in the defendant's
insurance policy can be found in the North Dakota statutes.
The North Dakota Financial Responsibility Laws are essen"A fifth situation is closing the door to settlement negotiations by
refusal to disclose the policy limits. It is a known fact that an attorney
handling a case worth $30,000 in settlement will be willing to settle for
perhaps, $22,500 if he knows the policy limit is only $25,000, in order to
avoid imposing a personal loss upon the insured. The company has no
right to protect itself from excess liability by stating that it will not disclose its policy limits. Such constitutes bad faith exercised in complete
derogation of the rights of the policyholder. Many states now require the
disclosure of policy limits; but, even in those jurisdictions which do not,
the company is playing with fire when it cuts off the possibility of receiving an offer within the policy limits by its refusal to open the door

to reasonable negotiations."

See also Keeton, Liability Insurance And Responsibility For Settle-

ment, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 1136 (1954).

39.
Sedgwick, Personal Injury Litigation from the Insurance CompanyDefendant Viewpoint, 23 Utah B. Bull. 101, 111 (1953).
40.
Justice Brennan, Seminar on Practice and Procedure under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 F.R.D. 42, 49 (1960).
41.
Supra notes 3, 5. See generally Williams, Discovery of Dollar Limits
in Liability Policies in Automobile Tort Cases. 10 Ala. L Rev. 355 (1958).

42. Supra note 23. See also Hillman v. Penny, 29 F.R.D. 159 (E.D. Tenn.
1962).
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tially the same as the Illinois statutes and are identical to the
3
Colorado and Montana statutes.
Where the injured party is a minor it appears to be even
more imperative that discovery be allowed. The guardian ad
litem is the representative of the court to look after the interests of the minor and it is the court's duty to see that all the
minor's rights are protected. 44 If the guardian ad litem is
not allowed to apprise himself of the rights the minor has, the
court has not accorded the minor the protection to which he
is entitled.
Justice Drew's dissent in Brooks v. Owens4. provides an enforcing epilogue.
"I can see no harm which will come from requiring
a defendant to disclose the limits and conditions of
the policy of insurance which he carries for the obvious benefit of the injured party. Moreover in negotiations or litigation both sides should have access to
all of the facts. The administration of justice should
not be a game of hide and seek. One party should not
be blindfolded in negotiating a settlement or a compromise. It is a fundamental concept that both sides
should have all the facts in the settlement of disputes
and this can never be achieved unless some method
is provided of requiring the full disclosure by a process which will afford protection to the party entering into a settlement of the terms and extent of liability insurance policies."
GERALD F. JOHANSEN

43.
N.D. Cent. Code § 49-18-33 (insurance or bond required of common
or contract carrier); N.D. Cent. Code § 39-16-17 (Proof of financial responsibility); N.D. Cent. Code § 39-16-20(6) (Motor vehicle liability policy).
44.
Shuck v. Shuck, 77 N.D. 628, 44 N.W.2d 767 (1950).
45.
97 So. 2d 693, 701 (Fla. 1957).

